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THE “STATE” OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY 
LAW: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DEBT 
RECHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS IN IN 
RE FITNESS HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL 
Abstract: On April 30, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc. held that bankruptcy courts have the 
authority to recharacterize debt as equity when the obligation does not constitute 
a “right to payment” under state law. In so holding, the court adhered to a state 
law approach and declined to adopt a federal rule for debt recharacterization, thus 
creating a split amongst the federal appeals courts. This Comment argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s state law approach is more desirable than promulgating a federal 
debt recharacterization rule because state law is more predictable and guarantees 
that a property interest will receive the same protections in federal bankruptcy 
courts as it would in state courts. This Comment also argues that a state law ap-
proach is preferable because it is rooted in precedent and avoids the risk that 
bankruptcy courts will infringe on substantive state policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy courts in the United States are courts of equity.1 In recent 
decades, there has been much debate over the extent and applicability of this 
equitable authority.2 As a result, there have been significant inconsistencies in 
judicial treatments of creditors’ “claims” in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceed-
ings.3 Fortunately, the federal appeals courts that have considered the issue are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 11 U.S.C § 105(a) (2012) (providing the “[p]ower of court” provision of the U.S. Bankrupt-
cy Code). In modern times, courts of equity are not bound by strict black letter law principles, but 
rather are empowered with broader authority to grant relief “in keeping with the fundamental notion 
of fairness.” Mark G. Douglas, Business Restructuring Review: Bankruptcy Court Empowered to Re-
characterize Debt as Equity, JONES DAY (Oct. 2003), http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/
publicationdetail.aspx?publication=1414, archived at http://perma.cc/744W-GKWG. This authority 
allows such courts to make decisions in the interest of producing fair and just results “to the end that 
fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not 
prevent substantial justice from being done.” Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). 
 2 Compare In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a bank-
ruptcy court’s equitable authority extends beyond the provisions of the Code in the interest of fair-
ness), with In re Pac. Express Holding, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
bankruptcy court’s equitable authority does not extend beyond the specific provisions enumerated 
within the Bankruptcy Code). 
 3 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (identifying varying treatments of this issue between 
the two circuit courts). In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to distribute the debtor’s assets 
and is charged with determining the amount and priority of parties in the distribution scheme. 11 
U.S.C. § 726(a) (2012). A “claim” in bankruptcy can mean one of two things. Id. § 101(5). First, a 
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now in agreement regarding the extent of a bankruptcy court’s equitable au-
thority.4 In 2013, in In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the latest circuit to determine that a 
bankruptcy court’s authority includes remedies beyond equitable subordina-
tion.5 The federal appeals courts now unanimously allow recharacterization of 
debt as equity, an action not specifically provided for in the Bankruptcy Code 
(“The Code”).6 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, however, contributed to an 
emerging circuit split regarding the applicability of this expanded equitable 
authority.7 Specifically, the courts remain in significant disagreement regarding 
when debt recharacterization is appropriate.8 
The doctrine of debt recharacterization constitutes drastic action by a 
bankruptcy court, thus heightening the implications of the circuit split.9 Debt 
recharacterization consists of a “substance over form” analysis of a pre-
                                                                                                                           
party has a “claim” in bankruptcy if the party has a right to payment from the debtor. Id. § 101(5)(A). 
Second, a party has a “claim” in bankruptcy if it has a right to an equitable remedy for breach of per-
formance by the debtor if the breach gives rise to a right to payment. Id. § 101(5)(B). 
 4 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir.) (allowing debt recharacteri-
zation and becoming that latest circuit to do so), reh’g denied, 529 F. App’x 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 5 See id. (diverging from prior precedent—the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit’s 
1986 decision in In re Pacific Express—to allow for a bankruptcy court to take action beyond mere 
equitable subordination). The U.S. Bankruptcy Code specifically enumerates the authority for equita-
ble subordination. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012). The doctrine of equitable subordination allows a court, 
after notice and a hearing, to subordinate all or part of a claim or interest relevant to the claims or 
interests of other creditors. Id. In order to equitably subordinate a claim in bankruptcy, the court must 
find that (1) the claimant engaged in some kind of inequitable conduct; (2) the inequitable conduct 
actually resulted in some harm or injury to the debtor’s other creditors, or conferred an unfair ad-
vantage on the claimant; and (3) the subordination would not be inconsistent with any other provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code. See id.; Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity Recharacter-
ization: Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2004, at 26, 
26. 
 6 See In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Hedged-Invs. As-
socs., Inc., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). The doctrine of debt recharacterization has received 
significant support because it addresses concerns that are distinct from those addressed by equitable 
subordination. See Sprayregen et al., Recharacterization from Debt to Equity: Lenders Beware, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2003, at 30, 30 (explaining that unlike equitable subordination that seeks to 
address inequitable conduct, debt recharacterization involves a factual determination as to whether or 
not the asserted debt is in fact an equity investment); Neil M. Peretz, Recharacterization in the Ninth 
Circuit: Has the Supreme Court Finally Derailed the Pacific Express?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 297, 
297–98 (2008) (explaining that debt recharacterization is not a variation of equitable subordination, 
but rather a distinct remedial action available to bankruptcy courts). While equitable subordination 
subordinates a creditor’s claim to the extent of the injury caused by the inequitable conduct, it does 
not provide a meaningful solution where a capital contribution is purported to be a claim when in fact 
it is substantively an equity investment. See Peretz, supra, at 297–98. 
 7 See, In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1148; In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 
749–50; see also infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of the circuit split) 
 8 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1148; In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 
749–50; see also infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of the circuit split). 
 9 See In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454–55 (3d Cir. 2006); infra notes 10–11 and 
accompanying text. 
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bankruptcy transaction.10 If a court determines that a lender’s purported loan is 
in fact an equity investment disguised as a loan, the court can recharacterize 
the debt as equity.11 When a debt is recharacterized as equity, the lender’s 
“claim” in bankruptcy becomes an “interest,” dropping it to the bottom of the 
distribution scheme and virtually guaranteeing no recovery on the funds ad-
vanced to the debtor.12 
In theory, recharacterizing debt as equity is extremely equitable.13 By in-
hibiting equity investors from unfairly availing themselves of the benefits of 
debt, debt recharacterization reinforces the Chapter 7 priority scheme.14 In 
practice, however, the federal appeals courts’ diverging application of debt re-
characterization creates a substantial risk of inequity.15 
Part I of this Comment examines the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Fit-
ness Holdings International that debt recharacterization is both within a bank-
ruptcy court’s authority and that it should be applied in accordance with applica-
ble state law.16 Part II addresses the differing applications of debt recharacteriza-
tion that have been adopted by other federal appeals courts.17 Finally, Part III 
explores the implications of the various approaches under the Bankruptcy Code 
and argues that applying state law is the most desirable method.18 
                                                                                                                           
 10 31 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 78:1 (4th ed. 2012). As a court of equity, the bankruptcy court 
evaluates the substance rather than the form of a transaction in order to protect the estate from unlaw-
ful claims for distribution. Id. If the claim substantively functions as something other than a debt, then 
it should not be treated as a debt, regardless of its form or label. See id. 
 11 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1147 (instructing the bankruptcy court on remand 
to recharacterize the purported debt if it in fact functioned as an equity investment); infra notes 44–58 
and accompanying text (explaining that the analysis of when a loan is actually an equity investment 
drastically differs across federal appeals courts). 
 12 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (2012). In the Chapter 7 distribution of the debtor’s assets, equity 
interests are at the lowest level of the priority scheme because interest holders step into the shoes of 
the debtor when the debtor ceases to exist. See id. The equity interest holders only receive distribution 
once all other parties have been paid in full. See id. Given the interests’ low priority, it is unlikely that 
equity interests will ever be repaid. Yadd Rotem, Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy Entitle-
ments: Corporate Bankruptcy Law’s Self-Executing Mechanism, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 79, 92–93 
(2008) (explaining that the value of the bankruptcy estate is usually insufficient to satisfy equity inter-
ests once all claims have been paid). 
 13 See White & Medford, supra note 5, at 26. Debt recharacterization is essential to the equitable 
administration of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. The Code clearly dictates that debt and equity are 
treated differently in the Chapter 7 distribution scheme, so it furthers the interests of fairness to allow 
the court to determine when a purported debt is actually an equity investment. See id. Absent such an 
authority, the Code supplies no meaningful recourse against investors that make investments to strug-
gling corporations but disguise the transfers as debt in order to avoid the inherent liquidation risks of 
equity investments. See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (explaining that applying federal law for 
debt recharacterization—as opposed to state law—creates a risk of inequity). 
 16 See infra notes 19–43 and accompanying text.  
 17 See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 59–81 and accompanying text. 
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I. DEBT RECHARACTERIZATION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Fitness Holdings International (“Fitness 
Holdings”) had received substantial funding from its sole individual share-
holder, Hancock Park, and from Pacific Western Bank.19 Hancock Park’s loan 
was unsecured.20 Pacific Western Bank’s loans were secured by all of Fitness 
Holdings’ assets and were guaranteed by Hancock Park.21 Several years after 
taking on the initial loans, Fitness Holdings and Pacific Western Bank agreed 
to refinance all of Fitness Holdings’ debt.22 Under this agreement, Pacific 
Western Bank made additional loans to Fitness Holdings, a portion of which 
were used to reimburse all of Hancock Park’s loans and to release it from all of 
its guarantees.23 This refinancing, however, proved unsuccessful.24 Fitness 
Holdings filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2008 and later converted the filing 
to Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2011.25 
A committee of unsecured creditors, acting on behalf of Fitness Holdings 
in the Chapter 11 proceeding, filed the initial complaint in this case.26 The 
complaint sought recovery of the funds transferred to Hancock Park as a result 
of the refinancing with Pacific Western Bank, alleging that the transfer was 
                                                                                                                           
 19 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1143. Hancock Park’s loan consisted of eleven unse-
cured promissory notes for a total of $24,276,065. Id. The terms of each note included a maturity date 
by which Fitness Holdings was obligated to pay a stated principal amount and ten percent interest per 
year. Id. Pacific Western Bank’s loans consisted of a $7 million revolving loan and a $5 million in-
stallment loan. Id. 
 20 Id. A secured loan is a loan that is guaranteed by collateral. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001). 
When making a secured transaction, the lender takes a security interest in personal property or fix-
tures. See id. In an unsecured transaction, the lender provides the loan based on a mere promise to pay 
but holds no right to repossess any property should the debtor fail to make payment when payment is 
due. See Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions, and the Structure of the In-
come Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REV. 467, 497 (1998). Unsecured loans 
receive distribution after secured loans but before equity interests in the Chapter 7 priority scheme. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2012). 
 21 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1143. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 1143–44. The decision to refinance debt and substitute it with existing debt is a business 
decision often utilized to extend the maturity date of outstanding debts in an attempt to regain solven-
cy and avoid bankruptcy. See Gombosi v. Carteret Mortg. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
 24 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1144. 
 25 Id. Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings include a plan for reorganization and rehabilitation of the 
debtor’s business and do not call for a liquidation of the debtor’s assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012). 
Conversely, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor ceases to exist and all of the debtor’s assets are 
liquidated and distributed through the Chapter 7 priority scheme. See id. § 726(a). 
 26 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc. (Fitness I), No. CV 10–0647 AG, 2011 WL 7763674, *1 (C. D. 
Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 529 F. App’x. 871 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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constructively fraudulent.27 The complaint also requested declaratory relief, 
particularly by moving the court to characterize Hancock Park’s initial loan as 
an equity investment and not a debt.28 The bankruptcy court dismissed all 
claims with prejudice.29 
Thereafter, the case was converted to a Chapter 7 case and the appointed 
bankruptcy trustee appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California.30 The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court, holding that precedent bars the bankruptcy court from re-
characterizing debt as equity.31 The trustee then appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.32 
B. Ninth Circuit Allows Debt Recharacterization and Applies State Law 
The Ninth Circuit reversed both the bankruptcy and district courts, hold-
ing instead that a bankruptcy court has the authority to recharacterize debt as 
equity.33 This decision was a departure from the Ninth Circuit’s longstanding 
precedent that was established in the 1986 Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit’s In re Pacific Express Holding, Inc. decision.34 In Fitness Hold-
ings International, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to indi-
cate that any pre-bankruptcy transfer made by a debtor can be avoided if it is 
not in repayment of a “debt.”35 Further, the Ninth Circuit observed that a 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. A transfer is constructively fraudulent if the transfer is made within two years of filing 
bankruptcy and the debtor, voluntarily or involuntarily, either made the transfer with the “actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud” the debtor or “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for the transfer.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). Constructively fraudulent transfers can 
be avoided in bankruptcy, which thereby removes the requirement to distribute assets to the transferor. 
Id. § 548(a)(1). 
 28 Fitness I, 2011 WL 7763674, at *2; see supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text (discussing 
debt recharacterization in full). 
 29 Fitness I, 2011 WL 7763674, at *2. 
 30 Id. at *1. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is elected to consolidate and distribute the assets of 
the debtor’s estate because the debtor ceases to exist when bankruptcy is filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 702 
(2012). The trustee has the right to avoid repayment of certain transfers, namely constructively fraudu-
lent transfers. See id. § 548(a)(1). 
 31 Fitness I, 2011 WL 7763674, at *5. 
 32 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1144. 
 33 Id. at 1147. 
 34 See id.; see also Pac. Express Holding, Inc., 69 B.R. at 115. Prior to Fitness Holdings Interna-
tional, debt recharacterization had a “checkered history” in the Ninth Circuit. See David S. Margolis, 
Debt Recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2011, at 50, 50 (describing 
the “checkered” history of debt recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit). Despite the clear pronounce-
ment in Pacific Express that debt recharacterization fell outside the authority of the courts, many low-
er courts questioned whether they had the ability to recharacterize debt given the widespread applica-
tion of debt recharacterization throughout the other federal appeals courts. See id. 
 35 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1145–46. In addressing the committee’s claim, the 
Ninth Circuit first analyzed the statutory requirement that for a transfer to be constructively fraudu-
lent, the debtor must have “received less than reasonably equivalent value.” Id.; see 11 U.S.C. 
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“debt” under the Code means any “right to payment.”36 Therefore, if a pre-
bankruptcy transfer does not fulfill a “right to payment” under state law, then 
the original advancement of funds is not in fact a debt and can be recharacter-
ized as an equity investment.37 
In holding that the question of whether a “right to payment” exists turns 
on state law, the Ninth Circuit relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent.38 In 
1979, in Butner v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, because 
state law governs the creation of property interests in this country, property 
interests in bankruptcy should be analyzed according to state law.39 The Court 
specifically discounted the creation of federal rules to determine when a “right 
to payment” exists in bankruptcy.40 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit adhered to 
this principle, holding that whether a “right to payment” exists in bankruptcy 
must turn on state law.41 
Relying on Butner, the Ninth Circuit held that a court has the authority 
recharacterize purported “debts” when state law would authorize such action.42 
Accordingly, because the district court below erroneously held that it was 
barred from debt recharacterization, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded 
the case.43 
                                                                                                                           
§ 548(a)(1) (2012). Because “reasonably equivalent value” is not defined in the Code, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Code definition of “value” to determine that a transfer is not constructively fraudulent 
to the extent that it constitutes “dollar-for-dollar repayment” of a debtor’s present or antecedent 
“debt.” In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1145 (referencing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 548.03[5] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012)); see 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) 
(defining “value”). 
 36 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1145. The Code defines the term “debt” as “liability on 
a claim” and the term “claim” as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012); id. § 101(12). 
 37 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1145. 
 38 Id. at 1146 (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 55). Supreme Court precedent dictates that, absent an act 
of Congress, state law determines the nature and scope of a right to payment. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
The term “state law” is interpreted expansively “to refer to all nonbankruptcy law that creates substan-
tive claims.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.9 (1991). Therefore, the term “state law” is also 
intended to include even federal law that creates a substantive state law claim. See id. 
 39 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 
156, 161 (1946) (“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at 
the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of overruling federal law, 
is to be determined by reference to state law.”). 
 40 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55–56; see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–51 (2007) (applying the Butner principle and holding that a court should not 
use a federal rule to determine whether a “right to payment” giving rise to a claim in bankruptcy ex-
ists). 
 41 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1147. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. at 1149–50. 
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: STATE v. FEDERAL APPROACH 
The Ninth Circuit’s state law approach to debt recharacterization articu-
lated in Fitness Holdings International is a minority approach and has created 
a split amongst the federal appeals courts.44 While the federal appeals courts 
that have considered the issue now all endorse debt recharacterization in bank-
ruptcy, the courts remain split as to when it should apply.45 The Ninth Circuit’s 
state law approach is shared only by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.46 The remaining federal appeals courts apply debt recharacterization 
using three different federal rules: (1) a per se rule; (2) a multi-factor test; and 
(3) an analysis aimed at the intent of the parties.47 
The per se federal rule allows recharacterization if the trustee can prove 
either that the debtor was initially undercapitalized, or that the loans were 
made when no other disinterested lender would have extended credit to the 
debtor.48 Put another way, the trustee must prove that the debtor either did not 
have sufficient capital to conduct normal business operations or was not eligi-
ble for loans from any other outside lenders.49 This approach focuses heavily 
on the circumstances of the transaction and ignores the substance of the trans-
fer entirely.50 
The multi-factor test utilizes a specific set of factors to determine whether 
the transfer functioned as a debt or as an equity investment.51 Although not all 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 529 F. 
App’x 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013); Dan Schechter, Bankruptcy Courts Have Authority to Apply State Law 
to Recharacterize Intercorporate Loans as Equity Investment for Purposes of Fraudulent Transfer 
Analysis, 17 COM. FIN. NEWSL., May 6, 2013 (explaining that all of the federal appeals courts that 
have considered the issue are in agreement that bankruptcy courts have the authority for debt rechar-
acterization, but the application of that authority is still highly debated amongst the courts). 
 45 Compare In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1147 (applying a state law approach to debt 
recharacterization), with In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2001) (creating 
a federal rule for debt recharacterization). 
 46 See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the principles estab-
lished in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 Butner v. United States decision in finding that the applicable 
law governing property interests in bankruptcy is state law). 
 47 See, e.g., In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 455–56 (3d Cir. 2006) (intent of parties); 
In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749–50 (multi-factor test); In re N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d 726, 
733 (11th Cir. 1986) (per se rule). 
 48 See In re N & D Props., 799 F.2d at 733 (refusing to recharacterize loans as capital contribu-
tions because the bankruptcy trustee failed to prove that the debtor was either initially undercapital-
ized or would have been unable to receive loans from any outside investors). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. (focusing on the debtor’s ability to receive loans and whether the debtor was undercapi-
talized, rather than on the substance of the transfer); cf. In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 542 (ex-
plaining that the per se rule assesses a finite set of factors and ignores the merits of the claim). The 
Fifth Circuit suggests that a per se rule has the effect of discouraging debt recharacterization. See In re 
Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 542. This disincentive is inconsistent with federal appeals court holdings 
that debt recharacterization addresses very distinct and important concerns. See id. 
 51 See In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749–50. 
54 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
federal appeals courts use the same multi-factor test, the factors considered 
always examine the terms and substance of the transaction rather than the ac-
tions or intentions of the parties.52 For example, multi-factor tests consistently 
consider factors such as the presence or absence of a maturity date, the pres-
ence or absence of a fixed interest rate, and any security granted.53 The factors 
are weighed subjectively, which gives a court substantial flexibility in its anal-
ysis.54 
The last approach, adopted only by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, focuses on the intent of the parties.55 This approach permits debt 
recharacterization in situations where the parties referred to the transaction as a 
loan when they in fact intended it to function as an equity investment.56 The 
Third Circuit instructs that the intent of the parties “may be inferred from what 
the parties say in their contracts, from what they do through their actions, and 
from the economic reality of the surrounding circumstances.”57 Inferring intent 
is inherently a very case-by-case analysis and allows the court to invoke broad 
equitable powers.58 
III. APPLYING STATE LAW IN FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
Recharacterizing debt as equity when the transfer of funds in question 
does not satisfy a “right to payment” under state law is the most desirable ap-
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. (applying an eleven-factor test derived from tax law that considers factors such as fixed 
maturity dates, schedule of repayments, and capitalization); see also In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 
F.3d 225, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2006) (using same eleven-factor test adopted in 2001 by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In re Autostyle Plastics); In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 380 F.3d 
1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying a thirteen-factor test that includes an inquiry into the intent of 
the parties and eligibility for loans from outside lenders). 
 53 See In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 233–34 (considering insider status, the lack of a 
fixed maturity date, and repayment schedule); In re Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1298 (considering the 
source of payments, adequate capitalization, and participation in management); In re Autostyle Plas-
tics, 269 F.3d at 749–50 (considering fixed interest rates, security of advances, and presence or ab-
sence of a sinking fund to provide repayments). 
 54 See In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 750 (explaining that no one factor controls the inquiry 
and each factor must be considered within the circumstances of the particular case). 
 55 See In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 455–56. 
 56 See id. The Third Circuit analyzed the multi-factor tests adopted by other federal appeals courts 
and recognized that while those tests contain “pertinent factors,” they all share the same overarching 
inquiry: did the parties call the transfer one thing when they clearly intended it to function as some-
thing else? See id. at 455. Specifically, the court reasoned, while the form in which the parties con-
struct the transaction may be telling, a better indicator of the actual substance of the transaction is the 
parties’ intentions. See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id.; Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid Fi-
nancial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1523–33 (2013) (explaining the im-
portance of examining the specific circumstances to reveal whether a purported debt investment in 
fact possesses the economic characteristics of equity). 
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proach.59 Because the state law approach remedies many of the overarching 
issues presented by the creation of federal rules for debt recharacterization, 
other federal appeals courts should adopt this approach.60 First, applying state 
law is more equitable and predictable than a federal rule because it guarantees 
that a property interest will be analyzed in the same manner before and during 
bankruptcy.61 Second, a state law approach is rooted in U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent and thus will likely enjoy more long-term applicability and ac-
ceptance.62 Third, a state law approach minimizes the risk that bankruptcy 
courts will infringe on substantive state policy.63 
The state law approach guarantees that property interests will receive the 
same protections in federal bankruptcy court as they would under state law had 
the debtor never filed for bankruptcy.64 Because property interests are created 
and defined by state law, absent some federal interest to the contrary, property 
interests should not be analyzed differently simply because bankruptcy has 
ensued.65 Many federal appeals courts point to the interest of equity as a feder-
al interest that supplants this state law approach.66 In practice, however, the 
federal rule approaches create inequity by affording property interests different 
protections in bankruptcy than under state law.67 Moreover, applying state law 
allows for uniform treatment of property interests prior to bankruptcy and once 
in bankruptcy court.68 This uniformity is desirable because is creates certainty 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 529 F. 
App’x 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 60 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1147; In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543. 
 61 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–51 (2007); 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
 63 See Friedman v. Kurker, 438 N.E.2d 76, 80 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 440 N.E.2d 1177 
(Mass. 1982); infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 64 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
 65 See id. The Constitution of the United States instructs that Congress has the authority to estab-
lish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 4. Accordingly, if Congress has not created a federal bankruptcy rule governing debt recharac-
terization, the courts should treat property interests in the same manner as they would have been treat-
ed if bankruptcy had not occurred. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 549 U.S. at 450–51; Butner, 
440 U.S. at 55. 
 66 See In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298–99 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Autostyle 
Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (claiming the bankruptcy courts’ 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 
(2012) equitable powers as grounds for supplanting state law when a federal interest exists). 
 67 See Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 
498–99 (1988). Despite many courts liberally utilizing § 105(a) power, the provision allows for action 
in furtherance of the Code, not for the addition of new judge-made provisions. See id. An expansive 
view of bankruptcy courts’ powers has the effect of creating rules that conflict with other substantive 
areas of the law and create substantial inequity. See id. at 498–500. 
 68 See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 549 U.S. at 450–51; Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
56 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:E. Supp. 
for both property owners and lenders and because it avoids the risk of one par-
ty receiving a windfall simply because bankruptcy ensued.69 
Further, the state law approach is rooted in Supreme Court precedent that 
dictates that state law governs the creation and treatment of property inter-
ests.70 Given the significant impact of debt recharacterization, it is important 
for a court’s analysis of it be founded in precedent.71 Relying on precedent lim-
its judicial interpretation of the law and yields much more consistent, predicta-
ble results.72 Unlike the federal rules approaches that are not rooted in prece-
dent, the state law approach ensures that bankruptcy courts do not overreach 
the extent of their equitable power by supplementing the Code with other sub-
stantive areas of the law.73 Moreover, because applying state law to property 
interests is rooted in precedent, this approach is unlikely to be challenged as 
falling outside the powers of the bankruptcy courts.74 
Finally, the state law approach minimizes the risk that a bankruptcy court 
will infringe on substantive state policy.75 Federal debt recharacterization rules 
may align with the approaches of some states, but in many instances can con-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 608–09 (1961) 
(explaining that voiding a claim in bankruptcy simply because a debtor failed to conform with con-
flicting federal and state laws would could create a “windfall” for the debtor because it could avoid 
repayment of a substantial loan that it otherwise would have been liable for); Juliet M. Moringiello, A 
Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522(F) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code and the Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 863, 911 (2001) (stressing 
the importance of applying state law conceptions of property in bankruptcy proceedings in order to 
avoid debtors obtaining a windfall). 
 70 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (explaining that property interests are created and defined by state 
law). 
 71 See Blake H. Bailey, Bankruptcy, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 603, 636 (2013) (recognizing the 
importance of Fifth Circuit precedent when arguing that state law should be applied to debt recharac-
terization). 
 72 See id. Adopting a state law approach to debt recharacterization is arguably a “cautious view” 
of debt recharacterization because it limits the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). See id. Requiring 
courts to strictly apply the applicable state law inhibits courts from interpreting § 105(a) as granting 
absolute equitable power. See id. 
 73 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 256–60 (2000). By creating a federal 
rule, the courts are unnecessarily bringing bankruptcy law and areas of non-bankruptcy law into con-
flict. See id. The justices of the Supreme Court have disagreed on interpretive methodology that 
should prevail when this occurs. See id. Some Justices believe a court should maintain a bankruptcy-
centric view while others prioritize the other substantive law and take a non-bankruptcy-centric view. 
See id. 
 74 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit’s decision to invoke an eleven-factor 
tax-based rule into bankruptcy law is arguably well outside the inherent equitable powers of the court. 
Cf. In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749 n.12. Notably, in a footnote, the Sixth Circuit explicitly 
acknowledges that there is some disagreement as to whether invoking a tax-based test in bankruptcy is 
appropriate. Id. 
 75 See Friedman, 438 N.E.2d at 80 (applying a state law approach that conflicts with federal 
bankruptcy rules). 
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flict with state law.76 While federal debt recharacterization rules regularly dis-
count the intentions of the transferor, state law approaches often highlight the 
importance of considering the objective intentions of the transferor.77 Further-
more, the multi-factor federal rules do not require a showing of inequitable 
conduct, whereas many states require some semblance of inequitable conduct 
in order to apply debt recharacterization.78 Effectively, when federal debt re-
characterization rules conflict with state law, they function to supplant substan-
tive state policy.79 Supplanting substantive state policy and substantive state 
rights creates a substantial risk of inequitable administration of the law and 
forum shopping.80 Accordingly, adopting a state law approach to debt rechar-
acterization is desirable because it eliminates these risks.81 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Fitness Holdings International held that debt rechar-
acterization is within the authority of bankruptcy courts and should be applied 
based on a state law approach. Although applying state law is a minority ap-
proach, it is the most desirable and should be adopted by the other federal ap-
peals courts. Applying state law guarantees equal protection of property inter-
ests before and during bankruptcy, relies on long-standing precedent, and elim-
inates the risk of federal rules infringing on substantive state policy. 
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 76 Compare In re BH S & B Holdings LLC, 420 B.R. 112, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismiss-
ing debt recharacterization claim for failure to plead the necessary fact to support the Autostyle fac-
tors), with Friedman, 438 N.E.2d at 80 (applying its own approach to debt recharacterization by close-
ly considering the “objective intention of the contributor”). 
 77 Compare In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749–50 (applying a federal debt recharacteriza-
tion rule that considers only the substance of the transfer), with Friedman, 438 N.E.2d at 80 (describ-
ing that Massachusetts state law recognizes that debt recharacterization “depends to some extent on 
the objective intention of the contributor”). 
 78 See In re Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d 
at 749–50. Compare In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying strict 
factors that do not include an equity consideration), with Friedman, 438 N.E.2d at 80 (refusing to 
recharacterize a purported loan without some showing of inequitable conduct). 
 79 Friedman, 438 N.E.2d at 80. 
 80 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). Federal rules should not be applied when 
doing so would create substantial incentives to forum shop and a risk of inequitable administration of 
the laws. See id. 
 81 See id; In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 714 F.3d at 1147. 
  
 
